CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 88

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the plan was to give the Federal Government a chance to bring the

situation in Aden under control before independence and to deter the

United Arab Republic from launching external aggression for a few

months after independence.

The plan also aimed to improve the chances

of South Arabia obtaining recognition by the United Nations. If the

original independence date of 1st January 1968 was adhered to, there was no prospect that admission to the United Nations could be arranged

before the autumn of 1968, and therefore no possibility of United Nations' protection against external aggression. The new timetable would however permit an application for membership during the autumn 1967 session of the General Assembly. These proposals carried a risk that the period during which we should not have internal responsibility

for the affairs of South Arabia, but would in fact be still considered responsible for the situation, would be extended; but the proposals originally approved by the Committee in November 1966 involve

similar difficulties.

Success depended to a considerable extent on broadening the base

of the Federal Government to include other elements in South Arabia, especially the nationalists, and on the extent to which the United Nations Mission, which would be visiting Aden in the near future, could

be persuaded to work with the Federal authorities. He was following

up indications that opponents of the Federation, particularly al-Asnag of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), might

abandon their terrorist activities and co-operate with the United

Nations Mission. He was also considering how to strengthen the

overloaded civil administration in Aden for the difficult months ahead.

THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that he supported the proposals of the

Foreign Secretary on the date of independence and surrender of sovereignty

over Aden.

It was necessary to avoid the total collapse of Government in South Arabia, while our troops remained there. There were great

advantages in bringing forward the date of independence to coincide with

the date when we handed over responsibility for Aden. However, the particular

proposals for a military presence after independence posed considerable

difficulties. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, was not confident

that the Federal forces would be able to control the internal security

situation in Aden on 1st November. There were doubts about the loyalty

as well as the efficiency of the Federal regular army. If, our forces

were to have the capability of resisting external aggression, they would

have to be located on Khormaksar airfield, which could not be protected

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